This paper explores the impact of regulations imposed by the Chinese government on the development of the Chinese IPO market between 2000 and 2011. Some of these regulations have affected the population of Chinese firms that went public domestically, some firms being excluding from the domestic IPO markets, others being induced to list abroad. We also provide evidence that, because of limits on prices and proceeds, the Chinese IPO market does not attract companies that need cash the most. Some IPO firms that raise large amounts of cash decide to pay large dividends shortly after going public, which investors interpret as evidence that their growth options were overestimated at the time of their IPO. JEL Codes: G28, G30, G38
Introduction
Well-organized financial markets guarantee that funding goes to firms that need to finance profitable projects. The issue of how to design financial markets so as to make them as efficient as possible is therefore important for the governments of emerging economies. In this paper, we focus on one specific country, China, in which repeated government intervention has shaped financial markets. We ask whether and how government-imposed regulations in this country affected the development of the Chinese IPO market over the last fifteen years.
We focus on China because it is the largest emerging economy, which underwent a long period of very high growth of both its industrial and financial sectors. The role of the Chinese government has been critical in this growth. In general, China is an extremely centralized economy in which the government plays a key role. This has been the case in the financial industry. The government has fully designed and organized a stock market that was virtually non-existent thirty years ago. In the process, regulations have changed often and sometimes dramatically. Thus, focusing on the Chinese market allows us to observe several rule changes in a limited number of years and to explore their effect on firm decisions.
We consider one segment of the Chinese stock market, the market for Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), between 2000 and 2011. This time period is characterized both by a significant evolution of the set of regulations governing the IPO market, and by a large number of Chinese firms going public in China and abroad. We focus on some of the most important rules and rule changes that occurred during the time period and try to estimate their impact on the efficiency of the Chinese IPO market.
The main specificities of the rules imposed to Chinese firms that want to go public are described in details in the paper. We focus mostly on two important characteristics: First, the government monitors closely the use of proceeds raised in the IPO process, from the start of the process. This limits significantly the flexibility of firms in using their IPO proceeds.
Second, the government imposes constraints on IPO prices and IPO size. These constraints vary over time in an arguably unpredictable way.
Using these rules and their evolution over time, we ask a number of questions. First, do regulations prevent some firms from doing an IPO, or do they induce firms to go public abroad? Are firms that go abroad for their listing because of regulations are those with the highest growth prospects? How do regulations and changes in regulations affect the behaviour of firms that go public? With what consequences for investors? Ultimately, can we claim that regulations have a negative impact on the quality of firms that list in China?
In a nutshell, our findings suggest that the rules imposed by the Chinese government do have a negative impact on the local IPO market. We find that they induce or even force firms from high-growth industries to list overseas, while the firms that list in China are from industries with more modest growth rates. These firms have significantly lower operating performance in the years following their IPO than those that list abroad. More generally, the average firm going public in China is not from industries with the highest growth potential, and our tests indicate that this is at least partially due to pricing regulations. This suggests that one of the effects of government-imposed regulations is that the IPO market does not attract the firms that need equity financing the most. Consistent with this argument, we find that the operating performance of recent IPO firms decreases shortly after their IPO. We also find that the average Chinese IPO firm pays surprisingly high dividends, relative to IPO firms in other countries and to seasoned companies listed in China, in the year following its IPO.
This seems to come from firms that raise more cash than they need to finance their growth returning this cash to their shareholders, another indication that these firms are not the ones that need equity financing the most. Investors seem to understand the inefficiencies caused by regulations and the incentives of firms: Stock price reactions are negative when recent IPO firms announce large dividend payments.
Identification is often difficult in this kind of empirical exercises, because we typically do not observe the counterfactual of a given rule. Ideally, to estimate the impact of a rule on the IPO market, one would need to observe the same market without the rule, which is obviously not available. Instead, we exploit the fact that regulations change frequently, in ways that cannot easily be anticipated by firms that are planning their IPO. We use these rule changes in a series of empirical tests, most of which rely on comparisons between different regulatory regimes for different groups of firms, e.g., IPO firms vs. listed firms, or firms that list domestically vs. foreign listings. These comparisons allow us to estimate how changes in the rules affect firms with similar characteristics but belonging to different groups.
Our conclusions also rely on the assumption that the frequent and significant rule changes that we observe and use in our empirical tests are exogenous to the listing decision, to the decision to list locally or abroad, and to firm quality. The main endogeneity problem we are facing in making this assumption is the possibility that unobserved missing variables affect government's decisions to change rules and these left-hand side variables. Our understanding is that the objective of the government in its stock market interventions is more political than economic. The government's main goal is to satisfy the appetite of middle-class Chinese citizens to participate in the stock market, while at the same time ensuring that this stock market participation does not turn into significant losses for individual investors. One of the tools at the disposal of the government is the control of the IPO market, which becomes tighter when the stock market shows signs of overheating. Stock market overheating is likely to be correlated with macroeconomic variables that also affect some of the IPO-related firm decisions. Some of our tests, in which we analyze firm decisions after the IPO, are unlikely to be subject to this criticism. In other tests, we compare the relative industry valuations of firms that go public and its evolution over time. These tests are also unlikely to be contaminated by macroeconomic variables that cause the government to intervene to control the overall stock market if these variables affect all industries equally. To deal with the possibility that they do not, we include industry x year fixed effects in our empirical specifications whenever possible, so that identification is at the level of each industry industries and for each year of the sample period separately. Moreover, as we explain in Section 4.2 below, the IPO process is generally very long in China. Therefore, firms that list locally may respond to macroeconomic shocks with a lag relative to the government. In spite of all these precautions, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that endogeneity affects some of our results, in particular those related to the decision to list abroad. We must be careful in interpreting some of the tests involving foreign-listed firms as causal.
The main contribution of this paper is to improve our knowledge of how governmentimposed regulations contribute to shaping financial markets in emerging countries. As such, it is related to articles that discuss the optimal organization of financial markets, like La Porta et al. (JPE, 1998) , Wurgler (2000) , or the way to achieve such an optimal organization, like Henry (2000) or Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer (2001) . A few articles also focus more specifically on regulations in IPO markets. Like us, Tian (2011) focuses on the Chinese IPO market, while Thomadakis et al. (2016) consider the Greek stock market and Chang et al.
(2012) the Korean IPO market. These articles generally focus on pricing regulations and their impact on pricing and short-term returns following IPOs. Our study aims at exploring the consequences of regulations on firm decisions and their impact on the population of firms listed on the local stock market. This paper is also related to studies that explore the Chinese institutional environment and its recent evolution (Allen, Qian and Qian, 2005, Pistor and Xu, 2005) . It also contributes to the Chinese IPO literature, which has mostly focused on the characteristics and performance (both in terms of IPO underpricing and of longer-term stock performance) of Chinese IPOs (Su and Fleisher, 1999 , Chan, Wang, and Wei, 2004 , Cheung, Ouyang and Tan, 2009 , or Du and Xu, 2009 , although some studies focus on the listing decision and the choice between Chinese and foreign IPO markets (e.g., Güçbilmez, 2014) or the quality of Chinese firms listing abroad and its evolution over time (Beatty, Lu and Luo, 2016) . Finally, this paper contributes to understand better how firms and investors in one large and important emerging market, China, react to frequent and important changes in regulations imposed by the central government. By and large, our conclusion is that these regulations have a significant impact on the composition of the Chinese stock market, and that both firms and investors react rationally to them.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we develop testable hypotheses.
Section 3 presents the data. In Section 4, we present and discuss tests of these hypotheses. In Section 5, we discuss these results and conclude. A complete description of regulations studied in the paper and of the data appear in the appendix.
Hypothesis development
The goal of the paper is to determine whether and how restrictions imposed by the Chinese government affect the Chinese IPO market. First, we need to verify that those restrictions are indeed binding. We do so in 
domestically.
To test this, one can verify that there is a positive number of firms that list overseas but could not list in China because they would violate some domestic listing regulations. The problem of this test is to identify the null hypothesis. To get around this issue, we use timeseries variations in the constraints imposed by the Chinese government. The hypothesis is that the number of Chinese firms that would list abroad without the regulation should be the same number we observe when the regulation is removed, and the difference between the number of Chinese firms that list abroad with and without government-imposed restrictions can be at least partially attributed to the restrictions. In that vein, we focus on one specific constraint on the relative size of IPOs and refine Hypothesis 1 to ask whether this constraint affects the number of Chinese firms listing abroad: Government-imposed restrictions on PE ratios and issue size may also discourage firms of high-growth industries to go public in China because the valuation they can obtain domestically is significantly smaller than the valuation they can reach in foreign stock markets. This may prevent firms in high-growth industries from going public in China and push them to turn to the foreign stock market instead. The next hypothesis is about the effect of regulation on the population of Chinese firms that decide to go public locally. The stock market should fund predominantly firms from industries with the best growth options. If regulation blocks these firms from the stock market, because they do not meet profitability requirements or because pricing constraints would make an IPO too costly for their current shareholders, then we might observe that the firms that go public are not necessarily those with the best growth prospects. Consider for instance the pricing restrictions that are in place during part of our sample period. When binding, these restrictions impose costly dilution to current shareholders who must sell underpriced shares to the investors who participate in the IPO. This may induce current shareholders of highgrowth firms to cancel or postpone the IPO. In 2009, the Chinese government removed pricing restrictions and allowed firms that raised more funds than the expected proceeds announced in their IPO prospectus to use the cash in excess of the initial filing amount as they liked. Following this decision, the average PE ratios of IPOs increased dramatically. At the same time, because firms preferred to have discretion in the way they could use the cash they raised, it was in their interest to announce low expected IPO prices. By voluntarily targeting PE ratios lower than those they could obtain, firms could raise more money than they announced in their IPO prospectuses and enjoy a lot of freedom in their use of this extra cash. Due to this behaviour of Chinese IPO firms, and the fact that IPO firms do not necessarily need cash to invest in new promising projects, some IPO firms should end up with cash in excess of their investment needs. These firms should return the cash to their shareholders. This effect should be more pronounced in firms with more concentrated ownership, in which large owners will receive a large fraction of the dividends, while the managers of firms with 3 The possibility to use the number of shares sold as an adjustment variable for the size of the IPO is limited by a 1999 law that imposes a minimum number of new shares, and even more by a 2007 decision that fixes the number of shares sold in the IPO (see Appendix B for a detailed presentation of this and other rules). dispersed ownership may prefer to keep cash in the company and to obtain private benefits from this cash. 
Data
The sample contains all Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) of Chinese firms in China between 2000 and 2011. Because we cover firms for up to three years after their IPO, the sample period is from 2000 to 2013. We use year 2000 as our starting point because it is the first year Chinese-listed firms employed a consistent and unified set of accounting standards (Chen et al, 2012) . We obtained our data from several sources, and hand-collected the remaining ones. We winsorize all the continuous variables at the 1% and 99% levels. For the non-IPO industry average calculation, we drop firms with negative PE ratios.
[Insert Table 1 here.]
Panel A of Table 1 flow is an indicator variable equal to one for recent IPO firms that pay dividends greater than their operating cash flows. We use this variable, which has also changed significantly throughout our sample period, to understand how firms respond to changing regulations.
Panel B of Table 1 reports summary statistics for Chinese firms that listed abroad during our sample period, for the subset of the variables that are available for these IPOs.
Comparisons between the two panels suggest that the two samples are quite different.
Chinese firms that list abroad are significantly smaller than those that list domestically. They also invest less (7.4% of their total assets against 8.8% for firms that list in China). Their operating performance is about twice as high (average ROA of 12.4% vs. 5.4%), as is their valuation when they go public: The average Price-to-Earnings ratio (Market-to-Book ratio) of firms that list abroad is around 61 (20), against 39 (9) for domestic listings. Unreported industry compositions of these two subsamples are also quite different, domestic IPO firms being more capital-intensive. As an illustration, Machinery, Chemicals and Technology, hardware and equipment are the three industries with the largest numbers of domestic IPOs during our sample period, each of them representing approximately 10% of our sample of domestic IPOs. By contrast, the three leading industries for Chinese firms that list abroad are Software and services, Consumer durables and apparel, and Real-estate, representing about 11%, 10%, and 7% of the sample of foreign listings, respectively. These industry differences need to be taken into account in any comparison between domestic and foreign listings. In fact, in these comparisons, we include industry × year fixed effects, which allows us to control for time-invariant differences across industries, but also for different time patterns across industries.
[Insert Figure 1 here.] Panel B reports average annual cash surprises (excess ratio) 6 of IPO firms. The excess ratio is defined as the difference between the final IPO amount and the initial filing amount.
In China, when firms apply for IPO listing, they have to justify their financing needs by committing to a specific and detailed investment project that they will invest in after going public using the proceeds of the IPO. Post-IPO investment in the proposed projects is mandatory and controlled by the government. The project announced before the IPO is 6 We use the terms cash surprises and excess ratio interchangeably in the text.
binding, unless the firm explicitly asks for a change in projects, which is costly and slows down the IPO process. A significant change in this rule occurred at the end of 2008. Before the change, firms could not raise more funds than they needed to invest in their projects.
After it, they can use more funds than announced in the IPO prospectus and use this cash windfall as they like. This rule change, together with the simultaneous removal of the PE cap, 
Results

Government-imposed constraints and the decision to go public in China or abroad
In this section, we test Hypothesis 1, which states that government-imposed constraints may prevent some firms from going public and induce others to list abroad.
[Insert Table 2 here.]
We start by observing that the restrictions imposed by Chinese regulators are actually binding for most of the IPO firms. Table 2 In fact, the very rare firms that manage to obtain PE ratios in excess of the cap are mainly state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which presumably have larger bargaining power in negotiating IPO prices.
One effect of government restrictions is that some firms may be forced to seek foreign listing. Panel B of Table 2 provides statistics on the number of overseas-listing Chinese firms that are otherwise in violation of domestic listing restrictions. The restriction that we study in the table is the regulation that states that "total proceeds cannot exceed more than twice of the common equity". This restriction was in place between 2003 and 2006, but given the time it takes between the start of the IPO process and the time firms actually go public, we assume it affected IPOs that were completed between 2004 and 2007. We focus on Chinese firms that list abroad and ask what fraction of these firms had total proceeds greater than twice their equity, when prices were constrained vs. when they were not. Consistent with Hypothesis 1-1, the fraction of firms violating the rule is 41% in the restricted period and only 28% in the non-restricted period. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Although we cannot rule out the possibility that rule-violating firms would have listed abroad even in the absence of the restriction, this result shows that regulations blocked access to equity financing to firms that had to go public in other financial markets in which the size of the equity issue was not perceived as an issue.
Another way to explore the incentives of Chinese firms to list abroad is by comparing industry valuations. We hypothesize that firms in industries with high valuations are more likely to seek overseas listing when valuations at the time of the IPO are limited by pricing constraints. Considering industries instead of individual firms allows us to abstract from individual firm characteristics that can explain listing decisions, and to focus on industrylevel growth options, with the idea that the average firm in industries in which growth options are larger is in greater need of external financing.
[Insert Table 3 here.] Since the proceeds constraint period is included in the pricing constraint period, the effect we In the four columns of higher.
These results suggest that constraints on pricing and proceeds imposed by the regulator affect the valuation of firms listing locally and abroad: when these constraints are lifted, valuation differences disappear or become more modest. Another related issue is about the type of firms that list abroad vs. domestically. One possibility is that random firms from the population of Chinese IPO candidates list abroad, in countries where they can obtain higher valuations. This is the benign view, in which the effect documented above simply reflects valuation differences between the Chinese and foreign markets, not intrinsic differences between domestic and foreign IPO firms. Another possibility, however, is that firms selfselect into foreign listing, and that firms of higher intrinsic quality list abroad. This alternative possibility is more pernicious because it implies that regulations have a negative impact on the quality of firms that are listed in Chinese stock markets.
[Insert Table 4 here.]
To distinguish between these two alternative possibilities, we compare the operating performance (Return on Assets) of foreign and domestic listings in the three years following the IPO in the first two columns of Table 4 . Summary statistics in Table 1 suggest that firms that list locally differ from firms that choose foreign markets in several important dimensions.
Adding industry effects and controlling for firm characteristics allows us to neutralize some of these dimensions. Consistent with the univariate results of Foreign List alone and interacted with the restriction period dummies is significantly positive (at the 1% level in column 1, at the 5% level in column 2). This suggests that the performance difference between domestic and foreign IPO firms is more pronounced when the regulator imposes restrictions on prices or proceeds. In other words, firms that list abroad obtain higher valuations, but mostly during restriction periods.
Another possibility is that the two types of firms differ in other dimensions than their performance. For example, listing abroad may allow firms to raise more funds, which leads firms with greater investment opportunities (and therefore greater value) to choose foreign markets. To examine this possibility, we repeat the previous test using capital expenditures as the dependent variable, in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 . In fact, firms listed locally invest slightly more than their foreign-listed counterparts in the three years following their IPO, in particular when they went public during restriction periods: the sum of coefficients on
Foreign List alone and interacted with the restriction period dummies is significantly negative (at the 5% level in column 3, at the 1% level in column 4). In light of previous results on valuation and operating performance differences, this suggests that domestic IPO firms invest in less profitable projects. Taken together, the results in tables 3 and 4 suggest that there is a quality difference between the two groups of firms, and finer subperiod analysis suggests that this is driven at least partially by regulations on the pricing of IPOs.
Government-imposed constraints and the decision to go public
In this section, we focus on Hypothesis 2, which predicts that, in the population of private Chinese firms, those that go public are not necessarily those that need financing the most.
Unlike in our previous tests, the evidence on this hypothesis can only be indirect because data limitations prevent us from observing the valuation, performance, and need for funding of private firms other than those that eventually go public. Instead, we first focus on industry valuations. Our premise is that capital should be allocated to firms in industries with the largest growth options. Thus, we should observe more IPOs in industries with higher relative valuations.
[Insert Table 5 here.]
In Table 5 Another way to gauge whether firms that go public in China are firms with good growth prospects is to examine the evolution of their performance around their IPO.
[Insert Table 6 here.]
We do so in Table 6 , in which we use a difference-in-differences approach to explore changes in operating performances in terms of sales and Return on Assets (ROA) between three years before and three years after the IPO. Treated firms are the domestic IPO firms in the sample. Control firms are firms that have been listed for at least two years as at date 0, that are in the same industry, year, terciles of total assets and sales growth, quartile of ROA, and that are the closest to the treatment firm in terms of ROA (for this sequential matching, we proceed like in Derrien and Kecskes (2013) ). Panel A of the table reports the distribution of sales growth and ROA one year before the IPO. IPO firms perform slightly better than their peers before they go public, but differences are not statistically significant. We further compare the ROA and sales over the period around the IPO (from the IPO minus 3 years to the IPO plus 3 years) in Panel B of Table 6 . Again it seems that on average IPO firms perform slightly better than similar seasoned firms in most years. Importantly, however, when we calculate the difference-in-differences between IPO and seasoned firms and surprising considering that IPO decisions in such firms may be driven by concerns other than valuation and funding needs.
between IPO-3 years and IPO+3 years, in Panel C, we find that the change in ROA is significantly worse for IPO firms than for their peers over that period, while sales keep increasing. The performance of IPO firms seems to decline around the time when they go public. This may be because firms that have access to the IPO market in China are not those that need financing the most. This result is also consistent with reversion to the mean of performance, which was observed in past studies using data from other countries (e.g., Chemmanur, He and Nandy (2014)).
The unintended negative consequences of the constraints
This section examines the third hypothesis, which predicts that government regulations and changes in regulations affect the behaviour of IPO firms. We focus on a significant change in the incentives of IPO firms that occurred at the end of 2008. Firms willing to do an IPO in China must do so to finance a pre-specified investment project, and IPO candidates have to disclose the detailed usage of IPO funds in their application process. This changed at the end of 2008. First, the pricing constraint was lifted, which implies that firms could go public at much higher valuations than they could previously obtain. Second, while the proceeds announced in the IPO prospectus still have to be used to fund a pre-determined investment project, the firm can use any proceeds raised above the cost of the project with complete discretion. In this new regime, firms have incentives to announce small-scale projects and small target PE ratios, hoping that the IPO price they will eventually obtain will allow them to raise significantly more funds, which they will be able to use as they see fit.
Hence our Hypothesis 3-1 regarding the evolution of target PE ratios of IPOs around this regulatory change.
[Insert Table 7 here.] Table 7 presents actual PE ratios obtained by IPOs in the two subperiods: it shows a significant increase, which is the direct consequence of the removal of price limits. This difference between target and actual valuations represent significant cash windfalls for IPO firms in the years following the removal of price limits.
Next we ask what firms do with these cash windfalls. We have seen in Table 6 that recent IPOs tend to grow more than listed firms in the three years following their listing. In the presence of large "cash surprises" (significant amounts of cash raised in excess of the amount filed in the IPO prospectus), firms could also decide to return cash to their shareholders.
Whether they do so should depend on shareholder incentives. When ownership is concentrated, shareholders have both strong incentives and the possibility to influence the decision to pay dividends. This is probably less the case in firms with dispersed ownership or in SOEs, in which managers have more incentives to use slack to extract private benefits.
[Insert Table 8 here.]
We test this hypothesis (Hypothesis 3-2) in Table 8 , in which we use the following specification:
The dependent variable is the payout ratio of firm i that belongs to industry j in the three years following the IPO. Columns 1 and 2 report the results for the first year after the IPO and columns 3 and 4 report the results for the three years after the IPO. The specification include industry  year fixed effects that capture the evolution of dividend payments at the level of the industry the firm belongs to. The main independent variables of interest are excess ratio (the amount raised above the targeted amount scaled by total assets of the IPO year), ownership, which measures the ownership concentration of the firm at the time of the IPO, and the interaction of these two variables. We also include controls lagged by one year relative to the dividend-payment year. Table 1 suggests that recent Chinese IPOs pay significant dividends (2.1% of their total assets on average in the three years following the IPO). The first column of Table 8 shows that higher excess cash and more concentrated ownership are associated with larger payouts in the year following the IPO. This effect is mostly driven by the interaction of those two variables (Column 2): IPO firms with highly concentrated ownership and large cash surprises pay high dividends. The effect is economically sizeable: A one-standard deviation increase in both Ownership and Excess ratio leads to an increase of about 6% of the standard deviation of the payout ratio (0.157 0.202 0.036 / 0.019 = 6%).
Taking a longer perspective, one notices that firms with high excess ratios and concentrated ownerships continue to pay larger dividends in the three years following their IPO, but the coefficient on the interaction variable in column 4 goes down by about a third compared to that in column 2. Also consistent with an attenuation of this effect over time, the effect of Excess ratio on dividend payout is no more significant in column 3, and the coefficient on List Year, which counts the number of years since the IPO, is negative and significant. In unreported robustness checks, we use different dependent variables such as payout ratio using dividends relative to earnings (instead of total assets) and a dummy variable indicating whether the dividend payout is larger than the net income or the annual cash flows. We also run logit regressions. The results hold qualitatively in all cases. Thus, the time when Chinese IPO firms are more likely to pay dividends is right after their IPO, provided that they raised more cash than they needed and that their ownership is concentrated.
Next we ask whether investors understand the implications of such large dividend distributions by some recent IPO firms. If our interpretation that these dividends indicate that the firm has no profitable project available is correct, investors should revise downward their expectations of the growth options of the firm when dividends are announced. This should lead to a significant decrease in the firm's stock price following the dividend announcement.
[Insert Table 9 here.] This is Hypothesis 3-3, which we test in Table 9 . This table reports Cumulative Abnormal Returns in the 7-day period around the announcement of the dividend by newly-listed firms in the three years following their IPO. Industry  year fixed effects control for the evolution of the average industry-level stock reaction to dividend announcement. The results suggest that a higher payout ratio is associated with a more positive response from the market.
However, the interaction of this variable with the cash surprise at the time of the IPO (the Excess ratio variable in the regression) has a large negative coefficient, which is not affected much in column 2 of the table, in which we add more controls to the specification. In this regression, a one-standard deviation increase in both Excess ratio and Payout ratio leads to an average stock price decrease of 0.44% in the period around the dividend announcement In other words, recent IPO firms that pay dividends are not penalized by investors, but those that pay a large dividend instead of investing the cash windfall they have obtained in their IPO are. This suggests that, at the time these firms announce their dividends, investors realize that they over-estimated the growth options of these firms. The downward revisions of these growth options leads to a decrease in the value of the firms.
[Insert Table 10 here.]
In the next table, we explore the propensity of recent IPO firms to pay dividends and market reactions to dividend announcements relative to listed firms. It might be the case that large dividend payments are frequent in China, and that our previous results are simply capturing this phenomenon. In the first column of the table, we regress payout ratios on firm characteristics, the most important of which is Seasoned, a variable equal to 1 for seasoned firms and 0 for recent IPO firms. Again, industry  year fixed effects capture industry-level evolutions of the dependent variables. Consistent with previous results, we find that recent IPO firms pay on average 0.5% of their total assets more than the average comparable listed firm. This is in sharp contrast with the evidence from more developed financial markets and with the intuition, which suggests that IPO firms are at a stage of their life cycle in which they need cash to invest. Consistent with the view that dividend announcements by firms that went public recently reveal that their growth options are more limited than initially expected, dividend announcements by recent IPO firms are associated with a return 0.8% lower than that of seasoned companies making similar announcements.
Discussion and conclusion
Our results suggest that regulations imposed by the Chinese government have a significant impact on the Chinese IPO market. In particular, pricing constraints seem to affect the decision to list in China or abroad. The most promising firms seem to prefer listing abroad. Although this is perhaps due to factors unrelated to regulations per se, our results suggest foreign listing by high-value firms is more widespread at times when pricing restrictions are more severe. Another important result is that firms change their behaviour in response to regulation changes, and investors understand the incentives of firms and react accordingly. For example, when firms that went public recently and had successful IPOs that allowed to raise more funds than they asked for announce large dividend payments, investors understand that these firms have less growth opportunities than they initially thought, and their stock price decreases.
Overall, these results show that the Chinese IPO market is not organized optimally, in the sense that it does not attract to the stock market the firms that need new financing the most.
IPO-specific regulations seem to play a role in this phenomenon, although other frictions may also be at play. One of them, the impact of which we cannot directly test, is the fact that the Chinese government is constantly experimenting with new rules. This creates a very uncertain environment for IPO candidates, which might decide to list abroad or to obtain alternative forms of financing. All companies applying for an IPO must meet the following historical financial performance criteria to be eligible for an initial public offering on one of China's two stock exchanges.
(1) Cumulative net income in the three years prior to the IPO must exceed 30 million renminbi (RMB), and the company cannot report a net loss in any of the three years;
(2) Cumulative revenue in the three years prior to the IPO must equal at least RMB 300 million or cumulative cash flow from operation in three years prior to the IPO must be at least RMB 50 million;
(3) Intangible assets cannot account for more than 20% of total assets; and (4) Net assets in the year before the IPO must total at least RMB 30 million.
From 2003 to 2006, IPO proceeds should not larger than twice the equity.
Window guidance
The only explicit regulation is the smallest number of shares issued. A 1999 law specified that firms with fewer than 400 million shares outstanding must have at least 25% of new shares following the IPO. Other regulations are not written but there is a consensus on them among market participants. 
The timeline of an IPO application
Firms that want to go public first need to approach an underwriter, which advises them and organizes the whole process, usually involving legal and accounting firms for relevant material. The application preparation takes at least one year on average.
The project that justifies the fund raising is determined at this stage. Any change to this project or to the amount required to invest in it requires another round of approval from relevant agencies, which is time consuming and costly. Thus, firms try to keep revisions from initial filing to a minimum from this point on.
Finally, the application is filed with the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The contents of the application are very similar to those in the prospectus. They include information on the funds needed and the expected amount raised, as well as extra funding sources in case the funds raised in the IPO do not cover the funding needs of the project.
The waiting period, defined as the difference between the date of application filing and the date of listing, includes at least two components. First is the period from application to final approval, and the second is the period from formal approval and listing. Both can potentially take a long time and are quite uncertain.
Overall, the waiting time is very uncertain. From our interview with the practitioners, the waiting period is from one to two years normally, unless the IPO market is suspended by the government.
The final prospectus, after approval by CSRC, includes information on the total amount needed to fund the project and the expected amount raised, equal to the number of new shares times the expected IPO price. Size is defined as the log of assets. Sales growth is defined as sales in the current year minus sales in the previous year divided by sales in the previous year. Leverage is the ratio of book debt to total assets. Ownership is the ownership of the largest shareholder in the company, plus the cumulative ownership of other shareholders (in the ten largest) that have family or business relations with the largest shareholder. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Cash flow is the ratio of operating cash flows to total assets. Capex is capital expenditures scaled by total assets. List year is the number of years since the firm went public. Statistics on these variables are reported for the first three years post-IPO. Offering PE (respectively, Offering M/B) is the price-to-earnings ratio (respectively, the market-to-book ratio) of firms, calculated at the time of their IPO. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. For all firms listed for at least 2 years, we sort ROA into quartiles and sales growth and total assets into terciles every year and match each treatment firm with a seasoned firm in the same industry, year, total assets, sales growth and ROA groups. The seasoned firm with the smallest difference in ROA with the treatment firm is chosen as the control firm. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for treated and control firms one year before the IPO, as well as p-values of differences between the mean values of the variables for treated vs. control firms. Size is defined as the log of assets. Sales growth is defined as sales in the current year minus sales in the previous year, divided by sales in the previous year. ROA is net income divided by book total asset. Panel B reports mean values of ROA and sales of treated and control firms from 3 years before to 3 years after the IPO. Sales are in 10 9 RMB. Panel C reports difference-in-differences estimates for ROA and sales from 3 years before to 3 years after the IPO. The first difference is the difference between the average ROA (respectively, sales) 3 years after the IPO and the average ROA (respectively, sales) 3 years before the IPO for both treated and control firms. The second difference is the difference between the differences of treated and control firms. DiD results are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Payout ratio is defined as dividends divided by total assets. Excess ratio is IPO proceeds minus filing proceeds, divided by total assets. Size is the log of total assets. Sales growth is sales in the current year minus sales in the previous year, divided by sales in the previous year. Leverage is the ratio of book debt to total assets. Ownership is the ownership of the largest shareholder in the company, plus the cumulative ownership of other shareholders (in the ten largest) that have family or business relations with the largest shareholder. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Cash flow is operating cash flows divided by total assets. Capex is capital expenditures divided by total assets. List year is the number of years since the firm went public. Industry × year fixed effects are included. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses in the first two columns, t-statistics allowing for clustering of standard errors at the firm level in the last two columns. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. Table 9 : Market reaction to dividend announcements This table presents determinants of the market reaction to dividend payout announcements up to three years after domestic IPOs. CAR is the seven-day cumulative abnormal return around the announcement of the dividend. Payout ratio is defined as dividends divided by total assets. Excess ratio is calculated as the IPO proceeds minus the filing proceeds, scaled by total assets. Size is the log of assets. Sales growth is defined as sales in the current year minus sales in the previous year, divided by sales in the previous year. Leverage is the ratio of book debt to total assets. Ownership is the ownership of the largest shareholder in the company, plus the cumulative ownership of other shareholders (in the ten largest) that have family or business relations with the largest shareholder. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Cash flow is ratio of the operating cash flows to total assets. Capex is capital expenditures divided by total assets. List year is the number of years since the firm went public. Industry × Year fixed effects are included. t-statistics allowing standard errors to cluster at the firm level appear in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
(1) Size is the log of total assets. Sales growth is defined as sales in the current year minus sales in the previous year, divided by sales in the previous year. Leverage is the ratio of book debt to total assets. Ownership is the ownership of the largest shareholder in the company, plus the cumulative ownership of other shareholders (in the ten largest) that have family or business relations with the largest shareholder. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Cash flow is ratio of operating cash flows to total assets. Capex is capital expenditures scaled by total assets. List year is the number of years since the firm went public. Year × Industry fixed effects are included. tstatistics allowing standard errors to cluster at the firm level appear in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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